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Abstract 
 
We analyze a model where irrational and rational informed traders exchange a risky asset 
with irrational market makers. Irrational traders misperceive the mean of prior 
information (optimistic/pessimistic bias) and the variance of the noise in their private 
signal (overconfidence/underconfidence bias). Irrational market makers misperceive both 
the mean and the variance of the prior information. We show that moderately 
underconfident traders can outperform rational ones and that irrational market makers can 
fare better than rational ones. Lastly, we find that extreme level of confidence implies 
high trading volume. 
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1 Introduction
Economic and financial theories have widely used the assumption that agents
behave rationally. Such an assumption has failed to explain some properties ob-
served in financial markets such as (i) the excessive volume traded [see Odean
(1998b)], (ii) underreaction or overreaction of market participants [see Debondt
and Thaler (1985)], and (iii) the excessive volatility observed in financial mar-
kets [see Shiller (1981, 1989)]. In order to explain these properties, financial
economists have assumed that investors have psychological traits that lead them
to behave irrationally. However, the possibility of behavioral biases for market
makers has been mostly ignored. Subrahmanyam (2007) suggests in the con-
clusion of his paper that this research avenue needs to be developed. Recent
evidences in the literature show that market makers, despite being experienced
experts, are also subject to psychological biases. Corwin and Coughenour (2008)
show that market makers suffer from limited attention leading to an increase
in transaction cost for less active stocks in their portfolio as they focus on the
more actives ones. Oberlechner and Osler (2012) find that currency dealers are
overconfident on average as they underestimate uncertainty and overestimate
their own abilities. Goetzmann and Zhu (2005) find evidences of participants
mood influencing the stock market. However, they find that it is not due to
individual investors trading patterns. This leaves the possibility of the market
makers’ moods affecting it.1
In this paper we define a theoretical framework where rational and irra-
tional investors trade a risky asset with irrational market makers. Introducing
irrational market makers contrasts with the existing literature and allows us
in particular to have a better understanding of how financial markets perform.
The novelty of this article is twofold. First we consider the possibility for market
makers to be irrational, and second we study the interactions between irrational
traders and irrational market makers.
Different forms of irrationality have been documented. However, some are
more prevalent than others. Among those are overconfidence and optimism.
Generally speaking overconfidence can be defined as the tendency of the sub-
jective confidence in judgments to be greater than the objective accuracy. This
has led people to overestimate their knowledge (miscalibration) and exaggerate
their ability to control events (illusion of control). Overconfidence also takes the
form of the better than average effect and finally unrealistic optimism where peo-
ple believe that they are less likely to experience a negative event than others.
According to Fabre and François-Heude (2009) optimism is the tendency to per-
ceive a situation as more likely to result in a favorable outcome, irrespective of
the objective probability of that outcome actually occurring.
We define an irrational investor as a trader suffering from overestimation/
underestimation of his knowledge (miscalibration) and optimism/pessimism.
This is then translated into a trader having erroneous beliefs about (i) the mean
1Papers, such as Tetlock (2011) Baker and Stein (2004) and Linnainmaa (2007) to name
but a few, have shown that liquidity providers using limit orders are not always rational and
therefore do not always obtain zero expected profits.
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of prior information (returns of the risky asset) and, (ii) the variance of the noise
in their private information. The former refers to the optimistic/pessimistic bias
and the latter refers to the underconfident/overconfident bias.2 Equivalently, an
irrational market maker has erroneous beliefs about the mean (optimistic bias)
and the variance of prior information (underconfidence/overconfidence bias).
We believe that modelling the optimistic bias as having only an effect on the
mean reflects the definition given by Fabre and François-Heude (2009).3 Us-
ing this theoretical framework, we develop a model of financial markets where
irrational traders along with rational traders trade a risky asset with a mar-
ket maker. This new setting combining rational and irrational traders with
irrational market makers allows us to derive interesting new features.
The market maker’s irrationality has different impact on the market. We
show that the variance misperception has an effect on price through its effect on
the level of liquidity. A variance optimistic or overconfident market maker be-
lieves that prior information is more precise than it is and therefore believes that
private information is less substantial than it actually is. As a consequence, she
adjusts her price less aggressively and increases market depth. As market depth
increases, the orders submitted by traders have less impact on the price and in-
formed traders whether rational or irrational respond by trading more intensely.
The exact opposite effects take place for a variance pessimistic or underconfi-
dent market maker. We now turn to the effect of the mean misperception. An
optimistic (pessimistic) market maker increases (decreases) the overall level of
price as she wrongly believes that the expectation of the risky asset is higher
(lower) than it actually is. Again, whether rational or irrational, traders adjust
the quantity they trade to the increased or decreased price. Given those basic
forces the following results are obtained.
• First of all, we show that, in contrast to most of the literature in Finance
[see Odean (1998b) or Kyle and Wang (1997)], irrational market makers
can obtain non-zero expected profit even if behaving competitively. This
is clearly the case when the market maker is variance pessimistic but does
not misperceive the mean of prior information (when the market maker
misperceives the mean, the results are not as clear cut). In that case
the market depth is decreased which increases the price. As the price is
increased, informed traders reduce the quantity they trade. However, as
the liquidity trading is inelastic the market markers’ expected profits are
positive. The opposite is true for a variance optimistic market maker with
correct beliefs of the mean of prior information.
• Second, in accordance with some of the previous literature [see Benos
(1998), Odean (1998b) and Kyle and Wang (1997)] we show that the pres-
ence of irrational traders may lead to the nonexistence of an equilibrium.
2 It is only recently that researchers have shown that overconfidence and optimism are
empirically distinguishable [See Régner et al. (2004) and Glaser et al. (2010)]. Hilton (2007)
shows the simultaneous presence of these two biases and their impact on decision making.
3Modelling in such a way the optimistic bias follows their model.
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This happens when traders would like to trade an infinite quantity and
market makers would like to supply infinite liquidity. Furthermore, we find
that a variance optimistic market maker exacerbates the nonexistence of
equilibrium whereas a variance pessimistic market maker alleviates it. A
variance optimistic market maker worsens the excessive trading whereas
a variance pessimistic has the opposite effect.
• Third, under the presence of irrational market makers, we find that an
underconfident trader can outperform a rational trader. This striking new
result contradicts Wang (2001) and was not put forward in the literature so
far. It relies on two important points: (i) the market maker’s irrationality
and (ii) the disagreement about the mean of prior information between the
underconfident trader and the irrational market maker. Indeed, contrary
beliefs, if sufficiently different, lead the underconfident trader to buy (or
sell) when prices are too low (or too high) on average. The first point,
(i), is documented in recent papers: Oberlechner and Osler (2012), Glaser
and Weber. (2007), Hilton (2001), and Glaser et al. (2007). The second
point, (ii), is illustrated by Krichene (2004), whose analysis recovers the
euro-dollar rate from option prices for June 2004 as expected by market
participants on May 5, 2004. He finds that the market was constituted
with two distinct groups of traders. One was expecting an appreciation of
the dollar with respect to the euro and one was anticipating a depreciation
of the dollar against the euro. Such a situation with the presence of two
groups having distinct beliefs can occur during a transition period for the
market when some market participants change their beliefs regarding the
asset while others keep their beliefs.
• Fourth, our model predicts high level of traded volume for extreme level
of confidence including the case where traders are underconfident. In the
previous literature this excessive volume traded has been explained by
the presence of overconfident traders [see Odean (1998b)]. In our setting,
we show that the volume traded might not be a monotonic function of
the traders’ level of confidence. Indeed it can display a U -shape form as
a function of the level of overconfidence. Our model also predicts high
level of volatility. We find that the traders’ responsiveness to private
information is greatly affected by the market makers’ confidence. For
the case where irrational traders are underconfident, an underconfident
market maker leads to too much trading from rational traders. It is their
large trading on private information that leads to the non-existence of the
equilibrium.
The paper unfolds as follows. The next section reviews related work. Then,
the general model is presented along with the definition of an equilibrium for
our model. In section 4, we derive the equilibrium for the general case and we
also analyze two benchmark cases i.e. the case where no market participants are
irrational and the case where only a subset of traders are irrational. In section
5, we provide comparative statics concerning the expected volume and stress
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the impact of irrationality on financial markets for the general case. Finally, in
section 6 we summarize our results and conclude. All proofs are gathered in the
appendix.
2 Related work
There is a large body of evidence in the psychology literature suggesting that
people do not always have an accurate perception of themselves and their sur-
rounding world. Such misperceptions impact people’s decision making. Evi-
dences suggest that people may display overconfidence such as miscalibration,
positive illusions, better than average effect and illusion of control.4 Miscali-
bration is defined as the tendency for people to overestimate the precision of
their knowledge. Ito (1990) demonstrates the existence of miscalibration in the
foreign exchange market. Further evidence is provided by Odean (1998a, 1998b,
1999) and Hilton (2001). Positive illusions has been documented in Taylor and
Brown (1988, 1994) and Weinstein (1980). Taylor and Brown (1988, 1994)
analyze the “better than average” effect whereas Weinstein (1980) looks at un-
realistic optimism. Financial practitioners are also well aware of the existence
of such psychological traits for investors trading in financial markets. For ex-
ample, the Union des Banques Suisses together with Gallup Organization have
launched in October 1996 the Index of Investor Optimism.5
Although underconfidence has received less attention than overconfidence,
recent evidence has cast doubt on the generality of overconfidence. People tend
to be overconfident on easy tasks where absolute performance is high and tend
to be underconfident on difficult tasks where absolute performance is low (Hoelzl
and Rustichini (2005), and Moore and Cain (2007) among others). It has also
been found that underconfidence in judgements of learning can increase with
practice. This phenomenon is named Underconfidence With Practice (UWP)
[See Koriat et al. (2002) and Serra and Dunlosky (2005) for instance]. In
an experimental setting, Glaser et al. (2007) compare the trend recognition
and forecasting ability of novices and financial participants. A third of the
financial participants report working for the market making industry. Two
types of trend recognition are analyzed: probability estimates and confidence
intervals. Underconfidence occurs for probability estimates for both groups,
though to a lesser extent for financial professionals.
Most of the literature in Finance predicts that overconfident investors trade
to their disadvantage and fare worse than their rational counterpart [see Odean
(1998b), Gervais and Odean (2001), Caballé and Sákovics (2003), Biais et al.
(2005) among others]. However, Kyle and Wang (1997) and Benos (1998) find
4See Hilton (2007).
5A detailed methodology used to compute the index can be found at
www.ubs.com/investoroptimism. The monthly level of the index is also given from its
launch date up to now. Other financial institutions also try to assess the market participants’
sentiment. For that reason, in September 2006, a survey denominated “Fund Manager
Survey” was conducted on behalf of Merrill Lynch.
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that moderately overconfident traders may earn larger expected profit than ra-
tional ones. Moreover, a common finding to all these papers except Caballé and
Sákovics (2003) is that trading volume, and price volatility increase with the
level of overconfidence. All these papers differ from ours as none of them con-
sider the possibility of irrational price setters. Odean (1998b) is the only other
paper considering irrational liquidity suppliers, this is done in a Grossman-
Stiglitz setting whereas we consider strategic market making. Irrational risk
averse liquidity suppliers buy costly information and overestimate the preci-
sion of that information. These overconfident traders are found to fare worse
that uninformed traders. Market depth is shown to increase with the level of
overconfidence. The misperception of the mean of prior information extends
both Kyle and Wang (1997) and Odean (1998b) and enables us to have a more
complete parameterization of irrationality. Therefore, the presence of irrational
market makers combined with the misperception in mean and variance of prior
information in an oligopoly framework constitute one contribution of our paper.
3 Model
We study a financial market where a market maker and several traders exchange
a risky asset whose future value v˜ follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and variance σ2v. Traders can be either informed or uninformed (noise traders).
Uninformed traders submit a market order that is the realization of a normally
distributed random variable u˜ with zero mean and variance σ2u. Informed traders
are risk neutral and can be one of two types: rational or irrational. N traders
are rational whereas M are irrational. Both types of traders have access to
private information, i.e. they observe a noisy signal of the future value of the
risky asset
s˜k = v˜ + ε˜k, with ε˜k ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
) ∀k = 1, ..., N +M and v˜ ∼ N (0, σ2v) .
These two types of traders differ in the beliefs they hold about both the distri-
bution of the risky asset value (prior information) and the noise in the signal
received.
As introduced in the previous sections, the irrational traders may display
several psychological traits: an optimism/pessimism bias and an overconfi-
dent/underconfident bias. We define an optimistic (pessimistic) trader as a
trader who has an erroneous belief about the mean of prior information with
v˜ ∼ N (a, σ2v) . An optimistic (pessimistic) trader mistakenly believes that the
mean has a value of a > 0 (< 0). The next psychological trait concerns the
beliefs of the variances of both prior information and signal noise. In our work,
an irrational trader j behaves as if his signal s˜j were drawn according to the
following noise distribution ε˜j ∼ N
(
0, 1
κ
σ2ε
)
. The parameter 1
κ
denotes the level
of confidence. The case κ > 1 (respectively κ < 1) represents the case of an
overconfident (respectively underconfident) trader.6 To simplify the notations,
6Note that the parameter κ takes into account both the overconfident/underconfident bias
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all irrational traders participating in the market are of the same type, i.e. they
misperceive the mean and the variance in the same way. We present in the
Appendix a generalization with different types of irrational traders, including
the case where some irrational traders are optimist only and others are over-
confident/underconfident only. The results confirm the ones obtained with only
one type of irrational traders. Notice also that irrational traders rationally an-
ticipates the behavior of both the market maker and the remaining informed
traders.
The main contribution of the paper is to consider that market makers are also
irrational. Our paper provides an understanding of the effect of irrational market
makers on the market. We assume that all market makers have homogeneous
irrational beliefs, contrary to the traders, and behave competitively.7 Therefore,
we can aggregate the behavior of the market makers and treat them as one player
in the game. We assume that each market maker has no access to any private
signal and that she misperceives the expectation and variance of the distribution
of prior information. Each market maker believes that the distribution of the
asset is such that
v˜ → N (a¯, κ¯σ2v) .
We interpret the parameter κ¯ as the “variance optimistic/pessimistic” effect
or the “overconfidence/underconfidence” effect: “variance optimistic” market
maker for κ¯ < 1 and “variance pessimistic” market maker for κ¯ > 1. At last, an
optimistic market maker believes that a¯ > 0.
The trading protocol is identical to Kyle (1985). The strategy of each ra-
tional trader i is a Lebesgue measurable function, Xri :  → , such that
x˜ri = X
r
i (s˜i) for i = 1, ...,N .
8 The strategy of each irrational trader j is iden-
tically defined: Xirj :  →  such that x˜irj = Xirj (s˜j) for j = 1, ...,M . Finally,
the market maker is risk neutral and behaves competitively. She observes the
aggregate order flow y˜ =
N∑
i=1
x˜ri +
M∑
j=1
x˜irj + u˜ before setting the price p˜. Let P :
 →  denote a measurable function such that p˜ = P (y˜).
We now give the definition of an equilibrium for our model.
Definition
(
Xr1 , ...,X
r
N ,X
ir
1 , ...,X
ir
M , P
)
is an equilibrium if the price set by
and the "better (worse)-than average" bias. Indeed, when deriving the equilibrium with two
parameters κ1 and κ2 for the variances of the prior information and the noise respectively, it
appears that only the ratio κ1
κ2
matters and so both effects vary jointly (see the detail of proof
in Appendix under Comments on a Different Parameterization of the Model after the proof of
Proposition 1). The results are then identical whether we choose one parameterization or the
other. However the results are easier to present with only one parameter incorporating the
misperception of all variances. Note that we have symetrically defined the behavior of both
the market makers and the traders. In particular both of them misperceive prior information.
7Considering a model where market makers have different parameters defining their irra-
tionality possibly including that some market makers are rational is left for further research.
Indeed, in this case the model would require market makers to behave strategically. Each of
them would set a price taking into account the type of other marker makers and so on. This
type of framework where traders can split orders with different markers has been studied by
Bernhardt and Hughson (1997).
8See Stokey and Lucas (2001) for a definition of measurable functions.
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the market marker is such that
p˜ = E [ v˜| y˜] ,
where E denotes the fact the market maker’s expectation is computed given her
erroneous beliefs and, given that price, the market orders maximize the traders’
expected profit conditional on the information received
Xri ∈ arg max
xr
i
∈
E [ (v˜ − P (y˜))xri | s = si] ∀i = 1, ..., N,
Xirj ∈ arg max
xir
j
∈
Eir
[
(v˜ − P (y˜))xirj
∣∣ s = sj] ∀j = N + 1, ..., N +M,
where Eir denotes the fact that the expectation for the irrational trader is com-
puted given his erroneous beliefs.
All agents know the number of rational and irrational traders as well as the
type of the irrational traders. Traders behave strategically meaning that they
take into account the impact of their orders on the price.
4 The equilibrium
In this section we solve for the general case where two types of investors (ir-
rational and rational) and irrational market makers participate in the market.
After presenting the general proposition, we analyze two special cases of that
proposition: the case where all market participants are rational and the case
where only some traders are irrational but not the market makers. This pre-
sentation will help us understand the effect of irrational traders and irrational
market makers.
We now give the proposition establishing the form of the linear equilibrium.
Let us define τ as the noise-to-signal ratio i.e. τ =
σ2ε
σ2v
.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique linear equilibrium if and only if the fol-
lowing condition is satisfied
Mκ (1 + 2τ)2 [κ (κ− τ) + 2τκ] +N (κ+ 2τ)2 [(2τ + 1)κ− τ ] > 0. (1)
The form of the equilibrium is given by
xri = α
r∗ + βr∗si, ∀i = 1, ..., N,
xirj = α
ir∗ + βir∗sj , ∀j = 1, ...,M,
p = µ∗ + λ∗y = µ∗ + λ∗
(
N∑
i=1
xri +
M∑
j=1
xirj + u
)
,
where the coefficients are given in the appendix. The parameters β∗’s represent
the traders’ responsiveness to private information whereas the α∗’s represent
the part of their order not based on private information. The parameter λ∗
represents the inverse of liquidity and µ∗ the part of the price not depending on
y.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Impact of market maker’s over/under-confidence.
We first comment on condition (1). This condition identifies the situation
where both the liquidity for the market and the quantity submitted by traders
are finite. From the expression, one can see that a variance optimistic market
maker exacerbates the occurrence of the non-existence of an equilibrium whereas
a pessimistic one alleviates it. This can be explained as follows. A variance
optimistic market maker thinks that prior information is more precise than it is
and therefore believes that private information is less substantial than it actually
is. As a consequence, she adjusts her price less aggressively and increases market
depth, i.e. decreases λ∗. As a consequence, informed traders whether rational or
irrational respond by trading more intensely, implying that the non-existence of
equilibrium is more likely to occur. In other words a variance optimistic market
maker leads to too much trading as it is sets a high level of market depth leading
to traders to trade more as their orders have less impact on the price. The exact
opposite effects take place for a variance pessimistic market maker and therefore
explains the fact that the non-existence of equilibrium is less likely to occur in
that case. However, an equilibrium may not exist with variance pessimistic
market makers if the overconfident traders are too overconfident. Note that this
condition does not depend on the optimism parameters of the market makers
or the traders.9
We now provide a more detailed analysis of the existence condition. It is
useful to look at condition (1) as providing a lower bound for κ¯ in order to have
an equilibrium. In that case the condition can be rewritten as
κ >
(
Mκ2 (1 + 2τ)2 +N (κ+ 2τ)2
)
τ
(1 + 2τ) (κ+ 2τ)
(
Mκ (1 + 2τ)2 +N (κ+ 2τ)2 τ
) .
A market breakdown can occur with only one type of traders present in
the market provided that the market makers misperceive the variance. Indeed
when M = 0, κ¯ must be greater than τ2τ+1 to obtain an equilibrium whereas
when N = 0, we need κ¯ > τκ2τ+κ . Figure 1, below, presents the equilibrium
existence condition for three different cases i.e. when N = 0, when M = 0 and
when both M and N are strictly positive. The existence of an equilibrium is
guaranteed when κ¯ is above the curve corresponding to the particular situation.
When both types of traders participate in the market, whether the existence
condition is more restrictive or not than with only one type of traders depends
on the level of overconfidence/underconfidence of the irrational traders and on
how rational traders react to the presence of irrational traders. When irrational
traders are overconfident (κ > 1), rational traders reduce their trading intensity
to limit the impact of their order on the price as overconfident traders trade “too
much”. This leads overall to a less restrictive existence condition. However,
when irrational traders have a large level of underconfidence, rational traders
9This is mainly due to the structure of the model: linearity of the equilibrium and normal
distribution functions.
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react by increasing their trading intensity leading to a more restrictive existence
condition. For a lower level of underconfidence, the existence condition can be
more restrictive with the two types of traders or less restrictive than if one type
of trader participates in the market.
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
k
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.30
0.32
kκ
κ
M = 20 and N = 0
M = 0 and N = 20
M = 10 and N = 10
Figure 1: Lower bound for κ¯ defined by the existence condition as a function
of κ. The graph is done for σ2v = σ
2
u = 1 and σ
2
ε = 0.5.
Impact of market maker’s optimism/pessimism.
We now turn to the effect of the market maker’s mean misperception onto
the level of price. On the one hand, an optimistic (pessimistic) market maker
increases (decreases) the overall level of price (through µ∗) as she wrongly be-
lieves that the expectation of the risky asset is higher (lower) than it actually
is. On the other hand, she also corrects for the inflated or decreased order flow
due to the misperception of the mean, a, by irrational traders. The presence of
optimistic (pessimistic) traders induces an inflated (smaller) order flow which is
corrected by the market maker by setting a negative (positive) intercept exactly
equal to that inflated (smaller) order flow. The combination of the two effects
determines the size and the sign of the intercept of the price function. When the
market maker and the irrational traders hold opposite beliefs about the mean
of prior information, the effect on the intercept is unambiguous.
The following Corollary establishes the form of the equilibrium for the case
where all market participants are rational (Benchmark 1) and for the case where
some traders are irrational whereas the market makers are rational (Benchmark
2).
Corollary 1
Benchmark 1: “All Rational Case” The linear equilibrium has the fol-
lowing form
xi = βsi, with i = 1, ...,M +N, with β =
σu
σv
√
(M+N)(1+τ)
,
p = λy, with y =
M+N∑
i=1
xi + u, with λ =
σv
√
(M+N)(τ+1)
[M+N+1+2τ ]σu
.
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Benchmark 2: There exists a unique linear equilibrium if and only if the
following condition is satisfied
Mκ (1 + 2τ)2 [κ (1− τ) + 2τ ] +N (κ+ 2τ)2 (1 + τ) > 0. (2)
The form of the equilibrium is given by
xri = βˆ
r
si, ∀i = 1, ..., N,
xirj = αˆ
ir + βˆ
ir
sj , ∀j = 1, ...,M,
p = µˆ+ λˆ = µˆ+ λˆ
(
N∑
i=1
xri +
M∑
j=1
xirj + u
)
,
where the coefficients are given in the appendix.
Proof. The first benchmark is proved by setting in Proposition 1 κ = 1, a = 0,
κ¯ = 1 and a¯ = 0.
The second benchmark is proved by setting in Proposition 1 κ¯ = 1 and a¯ = 0
while letting κ = 1, and a = 0.
The first benchmark corresponds to the case analyzed by Admati and Pflei-
derer (1988) whereas the second one is qualitatively identical to Kyle and Wang
(1997). As in Proposition 1, due to the presence of optimistic/pessimistic
traders, the price function has a non-zero intercept, µˆ, as αˆir = 0. The market
maker correctly anticipates that part of the order flow and the rational traders
do not react to the irrational traders misperception of the mean i.e. αˆr = 0.
The equilibrium may not exist in Benchmark 2 whereas it always exists in
Benchmark 1. Comparing the two benchmarks we can see that this happens due
to the presence of overconfident traders. More precisely this depends on the level
of their overconfidence and on their number. We obtain that the equilibrium
fails to exist when irrational traders are too overconfident (κ > 2τ
τ−1) and when
irrational traders are too numerous leading to “too much” trading.
We now compare the trading intensities, i.e. the reaction to private infor-
mation β, of the informed market participants for the two benchmarks and the
general case under study. Different effects are at work independently of the
case. When only rational traders are present, a noisier information leads those
traders to trade less intensely on their private information. When irrational
traders are present, the previous effect is also at work for both irrational and
rational traders. However, more noise implies that the more overconfident are
irrational traders the more they trade on their private information. As explained
before, rational traders respond to the presence of irrational traders. For very
underconfident (overconfident) traders, rational traders react less (more) the
noisier the private information. For intermediate values of confidence the effect
is ambiguous. These effects are also affected by the number of traders but over-
all remain true for any numbers of rational and irrational traders. A variance
optimistic (pessimistic) market maker amplifies (reduces) the previous effects.
In Figure 2 and Figure 3, we draw the trading intensities, i.e. the responsiveness
to private information as defined by the parameter β, as a function of κ where
11
the total number of traders is 20 from which 10 are rational. This is done for
both types of traders rational and irrational. The values of a and a¯ do not affect
trading intensities and we do not need to set them to any particular values.
1 2 3 4
k
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Irrational traders’ trading 
intensity (M = 10, N = 10 and 
Rational Market Makers)
Rational traders’ trading intensity
(M = 10, N = 10 and Rational Market Makers)
Rational traders’ trading intensity
(M = 0, N = 20 and Rational 
Market Makers)
Irrational traders’
trading intensity (M = 
10, N = 10 and 
irrational Market 
Makers)
Rational traders’
trading intensity (M = 
10, N = 10 and 
irrational Market 
Makers)
β
Figure 2: Trading Intensities, β’s, for both types of traders as a function of
κ. When the market marker is assumed irrational, her irrationality is κ¯ = 0.5.
The graph is done for σ2v = σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
ε = 5 and M +N = 20.
12
1 2 3 4
k
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
Rational traders’ trading intensity
(M = 0, N = 20 and Rational 
Market Makers)
Rational traders’ trading intensity 
(M = 10, N = 10 and irrational 
Market Makers)
Irrational traders’
trading intensity (M = 
10, N = 10 and 
irrational Market 
Makers)
Irrational traders’ trading 
intensity (M = 10, N = 10 and 
Rational Market Makers)
Rational traders’ trading intensity
(M = 10, N = 10 and Rational Market Makers)
β
Figure 3: Trading Intensities, β’s, for both types of traders as a function of
κ. When the market marker is assumed irrational, her irrationality is κ¯ = 2.
The graph is done for σ2v = σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
ε = 5 and M +N = 20.
We now compare the liquidity parameter, λ, across the different models.
This is done in Figures 4 and 5. When both types of traders are present,
overall, traders trade more on their private information leading to more liquidity
with rational market makers and variance optimistic ones. In that case and as
explained before variance optimistic market makers provide more liquidity than
rational ones. Variance pessimistic market makers lead to less trading on private
information which in turn leads to less liquidity in the market. As can be seen
in the second graph however when irrational traders become more overconfident
they increase their trading intensity which can lead to more liquidity than in the
“all rational case”. In Figures 4 and 5, the number of traders is fixed equal to
20. When the two types of traders are present 10 are irrational traders whereas
10 are rational traders. The values of a and a¯ do not affect trading intensities
and we do not need to set them to any particular values.
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k
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
M = 0, N = 20 and 
Rational Market 
Makers
M = 10, N = 10 and 
Rational Market 
Makers
M = 10, N = 10 and 
Irrational Market 
Makers
λ
Figure 4: Inverse of Liquidity, λ, as a function of κ. When the market
marker is assumed irrational, her irrationality κ¯ = 0.5. The graph is done for
σ2v = σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
ε = 5 and M +N = 20.
1 2 3 4
k
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
M = 0, N = 20 and 
Rational Market 
Makers
M = 10, N = 10 and 
Rational Market 
Makers
M = 10, N = 10 and 
Irrational Market 
Makersλ
Figure 5: Inverse of Liquidity, λ, as a function of κ. When the market
marker is assumed irrational, her irrationality κ¯ = 2. The graph is done for
σ2v = σ
2
u = 1, σ
2
ε = 5 and M +N = 20.
A question of interest is whether irrational traders can outperform ratio-
nal traders. It should be pointed out that condition (3) is derived under the
existence condition for the equilibrium. This is answered in the following propo-
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sition.
Proposition 2 The expected profits for the rational traders and irrational traders
are given, respectively, by
E [Πr∗] = (κ+2τ)
2
λ∗d2
[
σ2v (τ + 1) + a¯
2 (2τ + 1)2
]
,
E
[
Πir∗
]
= (2τ+1)
2
λ∗d2
[
σ2vκ (κ (1− τ) + 2τ)
−a¯ (κ+ 2τ)× (2τa− (κ+ 2τ) a¯)] ,
where d = (2τ +N + 1) (κ+ 2τ) +Mκ (2τ + 1) and λ∗ is given in the Ap-
pendix of Proposition 1.
An irrational trader outperforms a rational trader if and only if
σ2v (κ− 1)
(
κ
(
1− 2τ2)+ 2τ (1 + τ)) > a¯a (κ+ 2τ) (2τ + 1)2 . (3)
In particular, whenever the irrational traders and the market makers hold suf-
ficiently different opposite beliefs about the mean of prior information (either
a > 0 and a¯ < 0 or a < 0 and a¯ > 0) irrational traders can outperform rational
traders. Note that this is also true for underconfident traders.
Proof. See Appendix.
The expected profits are computed under the true distributions of v˜ and ε˜.
The level of optimism or pessimism, a, does not impact the expected profit. This
is due to two reasons. The first one being that a is independent of any relevant
information for the market maker. The second one comes from the fact that
the market maker perfectly evaluates the part of the order flow coming from the
misperception of the mean and therefore rightly correct for it when setting the
price. From the expressions of the expected profits, one can see that following
intuition rational traders always obtain positive expected profits. Irrational
traders may obtain positive or negative expected profits. This depends on their
level of confidence, on the noise-to-signal ratio and on whether and to what
extent the traders’ beliefs about the mean are different to the market makers’.
Condition (3) is necessary and sufficient for the irrational traders to out-
perform the rational traders. This condition can hold only if the equilibrium
exists, that is if condition (1) holds true. Under the equilibrium either irrational
traders can outperform in expected terms the rational traders or the opposite.
It should be pointed out that it does not depend on the number of rational
traders M and the number of irrational traders N . This is due to the fact that
M and N affect the expected profit of both the irrational and rational traders
in exactly the same way, and when comparing expected profits their effect can-
cel each other. It is also independent of κ¯. Indeed κ¯ affects the market depth
only and the rational and irrational traders react in exactly the same way to an
increase or decrease of market depth due to κ¯. Given that the market marker is
also irrational, this condition depends on both the market maker’s and the irra-
tional trader’s misperception of the mean, and on the irrational trader’s beliefs
about the variances.
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As in the second benchmark case, an irrational trader can outperform a
rational trader if his irrationality can act like a commitment device to trade
large quantity. However, in the general case two components αir∗ and βir∗
are available to the irrational trader for this commitment device. Given the
market maker’s mean misperception, αir∗ is now a key element to analyze this
commitment device. Beliefs about the mean from both the irrational traders
and the market maker affect the coefficient αir∗. Contrary beliefs, if sufficiently
different, lead the irrational trader to buy when prices are too low on average
or sell when prices are too high on average. For instance, if market makers are
pessimistic (a¯ < 0), they decrease the overall level of price and if traders are op-
timistic (a > 0), they want to buy the asset. Having this combination of beliefs
and sufficiently different beliefs implies that traders buy when prices are too
low. This obviously increases the overall irrational traders’ aggressiveness. As
a consequence, compared to the second benchmark, traders with a higher level
of overconfidence can outperform rational traders. Moreover, underconfident
traders who trade less aggressively on their private information (βir∗ < βr∗)
than their rational counterpart can fare better than rational traders. Finally
that condition states that an irrational trader who is neither overconfident nor
underconfident (κ = 1) but misperceives the mean only can outperform a ratio-
nal trader as long as the mean misperception of that trader and of the market
marker are opposite. In that case, we have βir∗ = βr∗, and αir∗ is used as the
commitment device as
∣∣αir∗∣∣ > |αr∗|.
We now look at the expected profit of the market maker. Market mak-
ers are competitive but irrational, therefore they compute the price such that
E [y (p− v) |y ] = 0 leading to p = E (v |y ) . As they do not use the right beliefs
as in Kyle (1985), we show that their profits can be positive or negative.
Lemma 1 (Market maker’s expected profit)
The expected profit of the market maker is given by:
E
[
ΠMM∗
]
= (2τ+1)(κ+2τ)
λ∗d2
[
σ2v (κ− 1) (Mκ (2τ + 1) +N (κ+ 2τ))
+a¯ (2τ + 1) (2Mτa− a¯ (κ+ 2τ) (M +N))] ,
where d = (2τ +N + 1) (κ+ 2τ)+Mκ (2τ + 1) and λ∗ is given in the Appendix
of Proposition 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
The following table summarizes, when clear, how an irrational market maker
performs overall.
E
[
ΠMM∗
]
κ¯ < 1 κ¯ > 1
a¯ > 0 a¯ = 0 a¯ < 0 a¯ > 0 a¯ = 0 a¯ < 0
a > 0 > 0 or < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 or < 0 > 0 > 0 or < 0
a = 0 < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 or < 0 > 0 > 0 or < 0
a < 0 < 0 < 0 > 0 or < 0 > 0 or < 0 > 0 > 0 or < 0
Table 1: Irrational Market Maker’s Expected Profit (E
[
ΠMM∗
]
)
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The market maker, when rational (κ¯ = 1, a¯ = 0), obtains zero expected
profit. However, when she is irrational, she may obtain an expected profit
different from zero.
• The parameter κ¯ affects the level of liquidity. An increase in κ¯ increases λ.
This reduces the informed traders’ sensitivity to their private information.
However, as noise trading is price inelastic and other things being equal,
the market maker’s expected profit increases when κ¯ increases. This alone
explains the results obtained when a¯ is equal to zero independently of the
value of a.
• Other things being equal, the misperception of the mean by market makers
has a negative effect on their expected profits. Indeed, an increase in price
will lead traders to sell more whereas a decrease in price will lead them to
buy more.
• Moreover, when the price increases (decreases) and if the irrational traders
are pessimistic (optimistic) they are even more incline to sell (buy) leading
to even more negative expected profits for the market maker. If the price
increases and the irrational traders are optimistic, the market maker’s
expected profit is either positive or negative depending on the magnitude
of both misperceptions of the mean. This explains why most of the cells
when κ¯ < 1 have a determinate sign and why when κ¯ > 1 most of the cells
have an indeterminate sign.
5 Impacts on financial markets
We now turn to some important measures of market performance such as price
efficiency, ex-ante volatility and trading volume.
Lemma 2 (Price Efficiency and Ex-ante Volatility)
• The ex-ante volatility is equal to
var (p˜) =
σ2v(N(κ+2τ)+Mκ(2τ+1))((κ+2τ)(N+κ(2τ+1))+Mκ(2τ+1))
((N+2τ+1)(κ+2τ)+Mκ(2τ+1))2
.
It increases with κ¯. The effect of κ is ambiguous.
• The price efficiency is given by
[var ( v˜| p˜)]−1 = (N+κ(2τ+1))(κ+2τ)+Mκ(2τ+1)
σ2vκ(κ+2τ)(1+2τ)
.
It decreases with κ¯ and increases with κ.
Proof. See appendix.
As described before, an optimistic (pessimistic) market maker sets prices
less (more) aggressively by increasing (decreasing) liquidity, traders respond to
it by increasing (decreasing) their trading intensity. For the ex-ante volatility,
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the effect on the market depth dominates the effects on the trading intensity.
Regarding now the price efficiency, on the one hand an increase of κ¯ decreases
the traders’ trading intensity and on the other hand it increases volatility.
We now explore the effect of each of the parameters defining the irrationality
on the trading volume.
Lemma 3 (Trading Volume)
Let us define z˜ =
N∑
i=1
|x˜ri |+
M∑
j=1
∣∣x˜irj ∣∣+ |u˜|. The trading volume is given by
E [z˜] = Nαr erf
(
a(2τ+1)
σv
√
2(1+τ)
)
+Mαir erf
(
2τa−a(κ+2τ)
κσv
√
2(1+τ)
)
+
√
2
pi
{
σu +Nσr exp
(
− (a(2τ+1))2
σ2v2(1+τ)
)
+Mσir exp
(
− (2τa−a(κ+2τ))2
2σ2v(κ)
2(1+τ)
)}
,
where erf (x) = 2
pi
∫ x
0 exp
(−t2) dt, σr = σ2v (βr)2 (1 + τ) and σir = σ2v (βir)2 (1 + τ).
Proof. See Appendix.
It is a well documented fact that overconfidence leads to greater volume
traded [see Odean (1998b), Gervais and Odean (2001), Kyle and Wang (1997)
and Benos (1998) among others]. We also find that result if we limit ourselves
to the case of overconfident traders with a rational market maker and with
irrational traders who do not misperceive the mean (a = 0). This is shown in
Figure 6 below.
Volume
κ
2 4 6 8 10
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Rational Traders Volume
Irrational Traders Volume
Total Volume
Figure 6: Total volume (E [z˜]), rational traders volume (E
(
N∑
i=1
|x˜ri |
)
) and
irrational traders volume (E
(
N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜iri ∣∣)) as a function of the level of
overconfidence when the market maker is rational (a¯ = 0 and κ¯ = 1) and
a = 0. The simulations are done with σ2v = σ
2
ε = σ
2
u = 1 and M = N = 10.
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In Figure 6, we can see that increasing the level of overconfidence leads to two
contradicting effects on the volume. Higher level of overconfidence leads rational
traders to decrease the quantity they trade as they try to reduce the overall effect
of the volume on price. The quantity traded by irrational traders increases with
the level of overconfidence. This leads to the total volume depicted in the graph
above.
However, when either a¯ = 0, or a = 0 or κ¯ = 1, this result is dramatically
changed. Our model predicts high level of volume traded for extreme level of
confidence (for the informed trader). We obtain that the trading volume can be
a non-monotonic function (U -shaped) of the level of confidence. When a¯ = 0,
traders increase their trading if the price is lower on average, or trade on the
misperception of the mean (a = 0). The two parameters a¯ and a have the same
effect on the traded volume. A larger mean misperception whether positive
or negative implies greater volume traded. If this increase is greater than the
reduction in volume due to the fact that traders trade less intensely on private
information, we obtain the result highlighted in Figures 7 and 8 below.
2 4 6 8 10
12
13
14
Volume
κ
Figure 7: Total volume (E [z˜]) as a function of the level of overconfidence
when κ¯ = 1, a¯ = 1 and a = 0. The simulations are done with
σ2v = σ
2
ε = σ
2
u = 1 and M = N = 10.
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Volume
κ2 4 6 8 10
5.0
5.5
6.0
Rational Traders Volume
Irrational Traders Volume
Figure 8: Rational traders volume (E
(
N∑
i=1
|x˜ri |
)
) and irrational traders
volume (E
(
N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜iri ∣∣)) as a function of the level of overconfidence when
κ¯ = 1, a¯ = 1 and a = 0. The simulations are done with σ2v = σ
2
ε = σ
2
u = 1 and
M = N = 10.
As explained before a lower κ¯ implies more trading. In Figure 9, we show
that if this over-trading is large enough it can result in large volume traded by
underconfident traders as well as rational traders.
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
20
40
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Volume
κ
Rational Traders Volume
Irrational Traders Volume
Total Volume
Figure 9: Total volume (E [z˜]), rational traders volume (E
(
N∑
i=1
|x˜ri |
)
) and
irrational traders volume (E
(
N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜iri ∣∣)) as a function of the level of
overconfidence when κ¯ = 0.3 and a = a¯ = 0. The simulations are done with
σ2v = σ
2
ε = σ
2
u = 1 and M = N = 10.
In Figure 10, we show the effect of the market maker’s misperception of the
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mean on the volume traded by the different traders. The effect of a¯ on the ratio-
nal traders’ and irrational traders’ volume is symmetric. Extreme beliefs imply
larger volume being traded, though the volume traded by irrational traders is
also affected by their own misperception of the mean.
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Figure 10: Total volume (E [z˜]), rational traders volume (E
(
N∑
i=1
|x˜ri |
)
) and
irrational traders volume (E
(
N∑
i=1
∣∣x˜iri ∣∣)) as a function of the market maker’s
mean misperception when κ¯ = 1 and a = 5. The simulations are done with
σ2v = σ
2
ε = σ
2
u = 1 and M = N = 10.
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the first one to show that excessive
volume can be a result of underconfidence in the market, and that irrationality
in mean can impact the trading volume.
6 Conclusion
We develop a model of financial markets where irrational traders along with
rational traders trade a risky asset with an irrational market maker. We model
irrational traders as traders who, as well as misperceiving the expected returns of
the asset, misperceive the variance of the volatility of the noise in the private sig-
nal. Those traders display different psychological traits: a pessimistic/optimistic
one (misperception of the mean) and an underconfident/overconfident one (mis-
perception of the variance of the noise in the private information).
We compare our general model to two benchmarks: an “all rational” case
where all market participants are rational and the case where only a subset
of traders are irrational with rational market makers. When comparing the
two benchmarks we find that the presence of irrational traders may lead to the
non-existence of the equilibrium due to “too much” trading taking place. We
show that a variance optimistic market maker exacerbates the non-existence
of equilibrium whereas a variance pessimistic market maker alleviates it. The
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introduction of an irrational market maker affects differently the traders. Ra-
tional traders have larger expected profits when the market maker is irrational.
The impact on the irrational traders’ expected profit is not as clear. Irrational
traders can have lower or greater expected profits due to the introduction of
an irrational market maker. We show that a moderately underconfident trader
can outperform a rational trader and it is true for an optimistic or pessimistic
trader. The necessary condition to obtain that result is that the irrational
traders and the market maker must hold opposite beliefs about the mean of
prior information. This is a striking and new result. Moreover, we also show
that an irrational market maker can, in expected terms, have positive profits.
In addition, we show that the volume traded might be non-monotonic function
of the traders’ level of confidence.
Our model predicts high level of volume traded for extreme level of confi-
dence including the case where traders are underconfident. This result raises
the question whether the observed high volume is due to overconfidence or to
underconfidence. This could be tested empirically as some indices such as the
Index of Investor Optimism or the “Fund Manager Survey” by Merrill Lynch
measure the level of confidence in the market. An experimental approach such
as the one of Bloomfield et al. (2000) could be also be used to test our model.
Our model also predicts high level of volatility.
An interesting extension of the model would be to look at how the results
obtained in the present model would be modified in a dynamic setting by allow-
ing traders to learn from the past. This is left for future research. The model
could also be extended by assuming that market makers are heterogeneous with
respect to their level of irrationality. The price competition in that context
could be analyzed. This extension is also left for future research.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (Irrational Market Makers)
After maximizing the traders expected utility we get for the different para-
meters
αir∗ =
1
λ (M + 1)
[
a
τ
κ+ τ
(
1− λ (M − 1)βir − λNβr)− µ− λNαr] ,
βir∗ =
κ (1− λNβr)
λ ((M + 1)κ+ 2τ)
,
αr∗ = − 1
λ (N + 1)
[
µ+ λMαir
]
,
βr∗ =
1− λMβir
λ (N + 1 + 2τ)
.
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The market maker sets a price, p, such that
p = E¯ [ v˜| y] = E¯ [v˜] + cov (v˜, y)
var (y)
(
y − E¯ (y)) , (4)
where the upper bar denotes that the expectation, covariance and variance are
computed given the wrong beliefs of the market maker.
Given the market maker’s additive misperception we obtain
λ∗ =
(
Mβir +Nβr
)
κ(
Mβir +Nβr
)2
κ+
(
Mβir
2
+Nβr
2
)
τ + σ
2
u
σ2v
, (5)
µ∗ =
(
1− λMβir − λNβr) a− λMαir − λNαr. (6)
Solving the above system of six equations with six unknowns leads if and only
if Mκ (1 + 2τ)2 [κ (κ− τ) + 2τκ] +N (κ+ 2τ)2 ((2τ + 1)κ− τ) > 0
for the irrational traders
αir∗ = (2τ+1)(2τa−a¯(κ+2τ))σu
σv
√
Mκ(1+2τ)2[κ(κ−τ)+2τκ]+N(κ+2τ)2((2τ+1)κ−τ)
,
βir∗ = κ(2τ+1)σu
σv
√
Mκ(1+2τ)2[κ(κ−τ)+2τκ]+N(κ+2τ)2((2τ+1)κ−τ)
,
for the rational traders
αr∗ = − a¯(κ+2τ)(2τ+1)σu
σv
√
Mκ(1+2τ)2[κ(κ−τ)+2τκ]+N(κ+2τ)2((2τ+1)κ−τ)
,
βr∗ = (κ+2τ)σu
σv
√
Mκ(1+2τ)2[κ(κ−τ)+2τκ]+N(κ+2τ)2((2τ+1)κ−τ)
,
for the market maker
µ∗ = (2τ+1)[a¯(κ+2τ)(M+N+1)−2Mτa]
Mκ(2τ+1)+(2τ+N+1)(κ+2τ) ,
λ∗ =
σv
√
Mκ(1+2τ)2[κ(κ−τ)+2τκ]+N(κ+2τ)2((2τ+1)κ−τ)
[Mκ(2τ+1)+N(κ+2τ)+(2τ+1)(κ+2τ)]σu
.
Comments on a Different Parameterization of the Model.
An alternative model would have been to consider that irrational traders
behave as if their signals, s˜j = v˜ + ε˜j for j = 1, ...,M , were drawn according to
the two following distributions
v˜ ∼ N (a, κ1σ2v) ,
ε˜j ∼ N
(
0, κ2σ
2
ε
)
.
The market makers’ irrationality remains the same. In that case solving for
the linear equilibrium by following the same steps as in Proposition 1, would
lead to the following result.
Result If and only if
Mκ1 (1 + 2τ)
2 [κ1 (κ¯− τ) + 2κ2τ ] +N (κ1 + 2κ2τ)2 [(2τ + 1) κ¯− τ ] ≥ 0,
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there exists a unique linear equilibrium. It is characterized by the following
parameters
for the irrational traders
αˇir = (2τ+1)(2κ2τa−a¯(κ1+2κ2τ))σu
σv
√
Mκ1(1+2τ)
2[κ1(κ¯−τ)+2κ2τ ]+N(κ1+2κ2τ)
2((2τ+1)κ¯−τ)
,
βˇ
ir
= κ1(2τ+1)σu
σv
√
Mκ1(1+2τ)
2[κ1(κ¯−τ)+2κ2τ ]+N(κ1+2κ2τ)
2((2τ+1)κ¯−τ)
,
for the rational traders
αˇr = − a¯(κ1+2κ2τ)(2τ+1)σu
σv
√
Mκ1(1+2τ)
2[κ1(κ¯−τ)+2κ2τ ]+N(κ1+2κ2τ)
2((2τ+1)κ¯−τ)
,
βˇ
r
= (κ1+2κ2τ)σu
σv
√
Mκ1(1+2τ)
2[κ1(κ¯−τ)+2κ2τ ]+N(κ1+2κ2τ)
2((2τ+1)κ¯−τ)
,
for the market maker
µˇ = (2τ+1)[a¯(κ1+2κ2τ)(M+N+1)−2Mκ2τa]
Mκ1(2τ+1)+N(κ1+2κ2τ)+(2τ+1)(κ1+2κ2τ)
,
λˇ =
σv
√
Mκ1(1+2τ)
2[κ1(κ¯−τ)+2κ2τ ]+N(κ1+2κ2τ)
2((2τ+1)κ¯−τ)
[Mκ1(2τ+1)+N(κ1+2κ2τ)+(2τ+1)(κ1+2κ2τ)]σu
.
Comparing those results with the ones obtained in Proposition 1, it can be
seen that by setting κ = κ1
κ2
in the model developed in the paper leads to the
equilibrium described here.
Proof of Proposition 2 It is straightforward to show that the irrational
traders’ expected profit are equal to
E
[
Πir∗
]
= (2τ+1)
2
λ∗d2
[
σ2vκ (κ (1− τ) + 2τ) (7)
−a¯ (κ+ 2τ)× (2τa− (κ+ 2τ) a¯)] ,
for the rational traders
E [Πr∗] = (κ+2τ)
2
λ∗d2
[
σ2v (τ + 1) + a¯
2 (2τ + 1)2
]
, (8)
where d = (2τ +N + 1) (κ+ 2τ)+Mκ (2τ + 1) and λ∗ is given in the proof
of Proposition 1.
Given the above expressions, finding the sign of E
(
Πir∗
)−E (Πr∗) is equiv-
alent to finding the sign of
σ2v (κ− 1)
(
κ
(
1− 2τ2)+ 2τ (1 + τ))− a¯a (κ+ 2τ) (2τ + 1)2 .
The comparison of the expected profits is then straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 1:
The market maker’s expected profit are equal to
E
[
ΠMM∗
]
= −NE (Πr)−ME (Πir)+E (ΠLiq) .
It is straightforward to show that the expected profit of the liquidity traders,
E
(
ΠLiq
)
, are equal to −λ∗σ2u. Plug the expressions found for the two types of
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traders (7) and (8) and for the liquidity traders into the expression above and
after some manipulations, one can get
E
[
ΠMM
]
= (2τ+1)(κ+2τ)
λ∗d2
[
σ2v (κ− 1) (Mκ (2τ + 1) +N (κ+ 2τ))
+a¯ (2τ + 1) (2Mτa− a¯ (κ+ 2τ) (M +N))] ,
where d = (2τ +N + 1) (κ+ 2τ) +Mκ (2τ + 1).
Proof of Lemma 2: Straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 3:
The volume is given by
y =
N∑
i=1
|xr∗i |+
M∑
j=1
∣∣xir∗j ∣∣+ |u| .
Given the form of both xr∗i and x
ir∗
j , we have that they both follow a normal
distribution such that
xri ∼ N
(
αr∗, σ2v (β
r∗)
2
(1 + τ)
)
= N
(
αr∗, σ2∗r
)
xirj ∼ N
(
αir∗, σ2v
(
βir∗
)2
(1 + τ)
)
= N
(
αir∗, σ2∗ir
)
.
From Leone et al. (1961) we obtain
E [|xr∗i |] = σ∗r
√
2
pi
exp
(
− (αr∗)22σ2∗r
)
+ αr∗ erf
(
αr∗√
2σ2∗r
)
,
E
[∣∣xir∗j ∣∣] = σ∗ir√ 2pi exp(−(αir∗)22σ2∗
ir
)
+ αir∗ erf
(
αir∗√
2σ2∗
ir
)
,
E [|u|] = σu
√
2
pi
,
where the function erf (x) = 2
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt.
The expected volume or trading volume is then defined as
E
 N∑
i=1
|xr∗i |+
M∑
j=1
∣∣xir∗j ∣∣+ |u|
 = E [|u|] +NE [|xr∗i |] +ME [∣∣xir∗j ∣∣] .
This leads to the expected volume equal to√
2
pi
{
σu +Nσ
∗
r exp
(
− (αr∗)22σ2∗r
)
+Mσ∗ir exp
(
−(α
ir∗)2
2σ2∗
ir
)}
+Nαr∗ erf
(
αr∗√
2σ2∗r
)
+Mαir∗ erf
(
αir∗√
2σ2∗
ir
)
.
Given the expressions of αr∗, αir∗, σ2∗r , and σ
2∗
ir we obtain for the expected
volume√
2
pi
{
σu +Nσ
∗
r exp
(
− (a(2τ+1))22σ2v(1+τ)
)
+Mσ∗ir exp
(
− (2τa−a(κ+2τ))2
2σ2v(κ)
2(1+τ)
)}
+Nαr∗ erf
(
a(2τ+1)
σv
√
2(1+τ)
)
+Mαir∗ erf
(
2τa−a(κ+2τ)
κσv
√
2(1+τ)
)
.
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7.2 Extension: Two types of Irrational Traders
In this subsection we only change the assumption concerning the homogeneity
of irrational traders. We now assume that there are two groups of irrational
traders: among theM irrational tradersM1 traders are of type 1 andM2 traders
are of type 2. A type 1 irrational trader behaves as if his signal, s˜1j = v˜+ ε˜j for
j = 1, ...,M1, were drawn according to the two following distributions
v˜ ∼ N (a1, σ2v) ,
ε˜j ∼ N
(
0,
1
κ1
σ2ε
)
.
A type 2 irrational trader behaves as if his signal, s˜2j = v˜ + ε˜j for j = 1, ...,M2,
were drawn according to the two following distributions
v˜ ∼ N (a2, σ2v) ,
ε˜j ∼ N
(
0,
1
κ2
σ2ε
)
.
The N remaining traders are assumed to be rational and are defined as
before. The market makers are irrational.
Given the two types of irrational trader, the market maker observes the
following aggregate order flow y˜ =
N∑
i=1
x˜i +
M1∑
j=1
x˜ir1j +
M2∑
j=1
x˜ir2j + u˜.
The following proposition shows the form of the equilibrium for this new
setting.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique linear equilibrium if and only if the fol-
lowing condition is satisfied
M1κ
1 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ2 + 2τ
)2 (
κ1 (κ− τ) + 2τκ)
+M2κ
2 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ1 + 2τ
)2 (
κ2 (κ− τ) + 2τκ)+N (κ2 + 2τ)2 (κ1 + 2τ)2 ((κ− τ) + 2τκ) ≥ 0.
The form of the equilibrium is given by
xri = α
r + βrsi, ∀i = 1, ..., N,
xir1j = α
ir1 + βir1sj , ∀j = 1, ...,M1
xir2j = α
ir2 + βir2sj , ∀j = 1, ...,M2
p = µ+ λy = µ+ λ
(
N∑
i=1
xri +
M1∑
j=1
xir1j +
M2∑
j=1
xir2j + u
)
.
The expressions of the parameters are given in the appendix.
Proof:
26
After maximizing the traders ’expected utility, as in the proof of proposition
2, we get the following system of equations
αir1 = 1
λ(M1+1)
[
a1 τ
κ1+τ
(
1− λ (M1 − 1) βir1 − λNβr − λM2βir2
)− µ− λNαr − λM2αir2] ,
βir1 =
κ1(1−λNβr−λM2βir2)
λ((M1+1)κ1+2τ)
,
αir2 = 1
λ(M2+1)
[
a2 τ
κ2+τ
(
1− λ (M2 − 1) βir2 − λNβr − λM1βir1
)− µ− λNαr − λM1αir1] ,
βir2 =
κ2(1−λNβr−λM1βir1)
λ((M2+1)κ2+2τ)
,
αr = − 1
λ(N+1)
[
µ+ λM1α
ir1 + λM2α
ir2
]
,
βr = 1−λM1β
ir1
−λM2β
ir2
λ(N+1+2τ)
The market maker sets a price, p, as in (4). This leads to the following two
extra equations
λ =
(
M1β
ir1 +M2β
ir2 +Nβr
)
κ(
M1β
ir1 +M2β
ir2 +Nβr
)2
κ+
(
M1β
ir12 +M2β
ir22 +Nβr
2
)
τ +
σ2u
σ2v
,
µ =
(
1− λM1βir1 − λM2βir2 − λNβr
)
a− λM1αir1 − λM2αir2 − λNαr.
Solving the above system of eight equations with eight unknowns leads to
the following result:
There exists an equilibrium iff the following condition is satisfied
M1κ
1 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ2 + 2τ
)2 (
κ1 (κ− τ) + 2τκ)
+M2κ
2 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ1 + 2τ
)2 (
κ2 (κ− τ) + 2τκ)+N (κ2 + 2τ)2 (κ1 + 2τ)2 ((κ− τ) + 2τκ) ≥ 0.
The equilibrium parameters are given by
βir1 =
κ1 (1 + 2τ)
(
κ2 + 2τ
)
λd
,
βir2 =
κ2 (1 + 2τ)
(
κ1 + 2τ
)
λd
,
βr =
(
κ1 + 2τ
) (
κ2 + 2τ
)
λd
,
αir1 =
(1 + 2τ)
(
κ2 + 2τ
) (
2a1τ − a (κ1 + 2τ))
λd
,
αir2 =
(1 + 2τ)
(
κ1 + 2τ
) (
2a2τ − a (κ2 + 2τ))
λd
,
αr = −a (1 + 2τ)
(
κ2 + 2τ
) (
κ1 + 2τ
)
λd
,
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λ =
σv
σud
[
M1κ
1 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ2 + 2τ
)2 (
κ1 (κ− τ) + 2τκ)
+M2κ
2 (1 + 2τ)
2 (
κ1 + 2τ
)2 (
κ2 (κ− τ) + 2τκ)+N (κ2 + 2τ)2 (κ1 + 2τ)2 ((κ− τ) + 2τκ)] 12 ,
µ =
(1+2τ)(a(1+M1+M2+N)(κ2+2τ)(κ1+2τ)−2τ(a2M2(κ1+2τ)+a1M1(κ2+2τ)))
d
,
where
d =
(
κ1 + 2τ
) (
κ2 + 2τ
)
(1 +N + 2τ) +Nκ1κ2
+ (1 + 2τ)
(
2τ
(
κ1M1 + κ
2M2
)
+ κ1κ2 (1 +M1 +M2)
)
.
.
The form of the equilibrium is similar to the equilibrium found in proposition
1 with the presence of two types of irrational traders. The equilibrium condition
can be interpreted in the same way as before that is when traders want to
trade unbounded quantity and the market want to supply infinite liquidity the
equilibrium fails to exist.
We do not show the condition for which irrational traders can fare better than
rational traders as the condition is more cumbersome than before. However, the
intuition of the condition is the same as for the previous case.10
A particular case of interest would be to consider the case where one group
is optimist (type 1) whereas the other one is overconfident/underconfident (type
2). The following lemma gives the form of the equilibrium.
Lemma A1: There exists a unique linear equilibrium if and only if the
following condition is satisfied
(M1 +N)
(
κ2 + 2τ
)2
(κ (1 + 2τ)− τ) +M2κ2 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ2 (κ− τ) + 2τκ) ≥ 0.
The form of the equilibrium is given by
xri = α
r + βrsi, ∀i = 1, ..., N,
xir1j = α
ir1 + βir1sj , ∀j = 1, ...,M1
xir2j = α
ir2 + βir2sj , ∀j = 1, ...,M2
p = µ+ λy = µ+ λ
(
N∑
i=1
xri +
M1∑
j=1
xir1j +
M2∑
j=1
xir2j + u
)
.
The expressions of the parameters are given by
βir1 = βr =
(1 + 2τ)
(
κ2 + 2τ
)
λd1
,
βir2 =
κ2 (1 + 2τ)
(
κ1 + 2τ
)
λd1
,
10All these computations all available upon request from the authors.
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αir1 =
(1 + 2τ)
(
κ2 + 2τ
) (
2a1τ − a (1 + 2τ))
λd1
,
αir2 = αr = −a (1 + 2τ)
2 (
κ2 + 2τ
)
λd1
,
λ =
σv (1 + 2τ)
σud1
[
(M1 +N)
(
κ2 + 2τ
)2
(κ− τ + 2τκ)
+M2κ
2 (1 + 2τ)2
(
κ2 (κ− τ) + 2τκ)] 12 ,
µ =
(1+2τ)(a(1+M1+M2+N)(κ2+2τ)(1+2τ)−2τa1M1(κ2+2τ))
d1
,
where
d1 = (1 + 2τ)
(
κ2 + 2τ
)
(1 +N + 2τ) +Nκ2
+ (1 + 2τ)
(
2τ
(
M1 + κ
2M2
)
+ κ2 (1 +M1 +M2)
)
.
Proof. This Lemma is proved by setting κ1 = 1 and a2 = 0 in the proof of the
previous Proposition.
As before the intuition of that configuration is the same as the previous one.
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